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1 Introduction
A substantial part of the economy is controlled by institutional investors, such as mu-
tual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, banks, and hedge funds. The academic
literature has extensively discussed the impact that institutional ownership has on firms
covering topics from R&D investment (Bushee, 1998) and monitoring (Chen et al., 2007)
to transparency (Boone and White, 2015) and CSR policy (Dyck et al., 2018).
Much less attention has been directed towards understanding the revealed preferences
of the institutional investors themselves : What can be learned from the observed port-
folio allocations? Do investors also care about other aspects besides their performance?
Specifically, does it matter to them how the firms they hold achieve their results? This
paper is the first to investigate differences in investor preferences for firms that aggres-
sively exploit regulatory “wiggle room” (WR). I posit that all firms have to some degree
a freedom of choice, a leeway, or wiggle room that they can exploit within acceptable
corporate practices, before entering illegal territory. WR exploitation is identified on the
firm level by relatively aggressive tax planning, financial reporting, and earnings man-
agement practices. To obtain the implied preferences of institutional investors, I adapt
the methodology of Gibson and Krueger (2018): I download the quarterly portfolio hold-
ings from the Thomson 13F database, and then compute for every quarter the weighted
average of exploited WR in each investor’s holdings, the “portfolio wiggle room” (PWR).
It could be the case that some institutional investors prefer “aggressive firms” that
exploit WR to a great extent, whereas others are more keen to hold “cautious” firms
that do not exhaust WR. As it is not ex ante clear that this should be the case, the first
question this paper asks is whether institutional investors differ significantly with respect
to their preferences for WR. The second question then asks whether such preferences affect
portfolio performance. Answering these questions is crucial for at least two reasons: First,
the growing interest in the “purpose” of institutional investors (Fink, 2018) discounts the
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implications of heterogeneity in the degree to which firms abide by regulation. Some
institutional investors could actively facilitate the exploitation of regulatory loopholes,
thereby creating an “unfair” comparative advantage for their portfolio firms. Second, via
portfolio allocation choices, investors could “nudge” firms into a more or less exploiting
behavior, which can have important externalities, e.g., on market transparency.
In summary, I find that long-term and low-turnover investors hold firms that exploit
3% more WR than those held by short-term and high-turnover investors. This suggests
that both investors with short horizons and those that frequently rebalance their hold-
ings value the additional transparency implied by small WR. Furthermore, institutional
investors significantly reduce their PWR after they fire one of their financial advisers due
to a misconduct disclosure. This suggests that a shock to the perceived value of trust
produces a shift in the preferences of institutional investors for WR exploitation. Finally,
I find that investors with smaller PWR achieve somewhat higher alphas but are more
exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Taken together, it seems that institutional investors have
heterogeneous preferences for regulatory wiggle room exploitation, which cannot be fully
rationalized by a profit maximization motive alone: Investors who hold cautious firms
seem to also care how the performance is achieved, especially so when they deem trust
to be especially valuable.
To better understand the mechanisms that could explain the findings, this paper seeks
to answer two broad questions: First, why should institutional investors have different
preferences for WR? Second, do these differences have performance implications? Intu-
itively, different strategies could drive heterogeneity: Investors that have short horizons
and rebalance their portfolios often will prefer firms that are more transparent, as this
will enable better informed trading. Market conditions could also play a role regardless
of investment strategy: Baker and Wurgler (2007) argue that when sentiment is high,
investors tend to prefer more “speculative” and therefore opaque securities. I expect
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that short-term and high-turnover investors will hold firms with lower WR. I also expect
that when market sentiment is high, all investors will tend to hold firms with higher WR
(Hypothesis 1 - Transparency).
Second, heterogeneity in preferences can also be a consequence of structural differences
amongst investors: Those that are subject to public scrutiny (e.g.: banks, insurance
companies, or pension funds) should prefer holdings with small WR (Hypothesis 2 -
Scrutiny). This is because firms that are overly aggressive in exploiting the regulatory
environment, could be managed by “suspect CEOs”, and therefore also be more likely to
get involved in scandals and illegal behavior (Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Cline et al., 2018).
Finally, investors that are “dedicated” - i.e., that have a long-term horizon, are undi-
versified, and not susceptible to current earning news (Bushee, 1998) - could prefer firms
that do not fully exhaust WR (Hypothesis 3 - Trust). Honesty is fundamental for trust
to develop among people (O’Neill, 2002), and trust in management improves employee
satisfaction (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002), which in turn has a positive long-term impact on
overall firm performance (Edmans, 2011). A CEO that does not exploit WR could be
perceived as more honest and trustworthy (Gibson et al., 2017). Since this channel is
likely to be most effective in the long-run, it should be most relevant for dedicated in-
vestors as they take a holistic view on their holdings. One way to test this is to exploit a
plausibly exogenous shock to the perceived importance of trust. Gennaioli et al. (2015)
show theoretically and Gurun et al. (2017) confirm empirically that the relationship be-
tween an investor and her advisor crucially relies on trust. In this spirit, a financial
adviser that discloses a case of misconduct (Egan et al., 2018a) could breach the trust of
the investor that employs him. This can be seen as a shock to the investor’s perceived
importance of trust that would induce a change in her preference for wiggle room ex-
ploitation. I expect investors who experience misconduct to shift their portfolios towards
more cautious firms. On related lines, Lins et al. (2017) and Amiraslani et al. (2017)
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show that being trustworthy will be deemed as more valuable during turbulent periods
of high uncertainty. Thus I expect that when market uncertainty becomes extreme all
investors will tend to prefer firms with lower WR.
The second question this paper addresses is whether differences in WR preferences
have investment performance implications. Exploiting regulatory leeway can cause fi-
nancial gains, e.g., by decreasing the effective tax rate (Bird and Karolyi, 2017) or by
(barely) beating analysts’ earnings forecasts (Bhojraj et al., 2009). Therefore, I expect
that the portfolios of investors who tend to hold aggressive firms will generate higher
returns (Hypothesis 4 - Performance). Lastly, high WR firms have, to some extent, more
alleys available to conceal poor results. This would allow them to smooth performance
more, something valued by both management (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995) and investors
(Rountree et al., 2008). Therefore, having higher PWR should be correlated with less
stock price volatility (Hypothesis 5 - Risk).
The sample used to test these hypotheses is retrieved from the Thomson 13F database
(CDA/Spectrum) and spans 1995 to 2017, totaling more than 100,000 quarterly obser-
vations of 8,000 investors. These represent all US firms and advisers with assets under
management exceeding USD 100mm.
In order to assess WR exploitation at the individual holdings level, I use several
proxies: (1) earnings management (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al.,
2005), (2) disaggregation quality of financial statements (Chen et al., 2015), (3) long-term
effective cash tax rate (Dyreng et al., 2008), (4) discretionary permanent tax differences
(Frank et al., 2009), (5) subsidiaries in tax haven countries (Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009),
and (6) beating the median consensus earnings forecast by no more than one USD cent
(Bhojraj et al., 2009). To identify aggressive firms, I construct percentile rankings of
(1) - (4) for every industry-year combination. For (5) I resort to a within industry-year
indicator that captures above average tax shelter usage; (6) is directly computed as an
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indicator. Finally, the basic proxy for exploited WR is the average of (1) to (6).
Institutional investors are classified on the basis of: (1) investment horizon in short-
and long-term (Cremers and Pareek, 2015); (2) rebalancing activity in low- and high-
turnover (Carhart, 1997); (3) investment strategy in quasi-indexers, transient, and ded-
icated investors (Bushee, 1998); (4) fiduciary duties in banks, pension funds, insurers,
investment firms, and advisers (Bushee, 2001). Finally, to assess portfolio performance
I compute quarterly excess returns, portfolio alphas (Fama and French, 1996), and ex-
posure to idiosyncratic volatility (Ang et al., 2006). I extract the revealed preferences
of investors through a value weighted average of the exploited WR of their portfolio
holdings, i.e., “portfolio wiggle room” (PWR).
In support of Hypothesis 1 - Transparency I find that long-term horizon is associated
with 3.7% larger PWR compared to a short-term horizon. Moreover, infrequent traders
hold portfolios with 3.3% higher PWR than high-turnover investors. This suggests that
investors who hold stocks for shorter periods, and trade more, value the increased trans-
parency of cautious firms. Market conditions also play a role: A one standard deviation
(0.6) increase in market sentiment is associated with an increase in average PWR of
0.5 percentage points (pp). When sentiment is high, institutional investors tend to pre-
fer firms that are more aggressive and thus opaque, as these may also appear as more
speculative.
My findings contradict Hypothesis 2 - Scrutiny, since the average exploited PWR of
banks is 2.3% higher than for miscellaneous investors. This suggests that exposure to
public scrutiny is not enough to make investors prefer holding cautious firms.
I can confirm Hypothesis 3 - Trust : Dedicated investors have a PWR 7.0% smaller
than investors closely following an index. The trust channel seems to be most important
for holistic and specialized investors, with particularly long-term horizon. However, when
market conditions become particularly volatile, all investors tend to hold more cautious
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firms. This suggests that being cautious is particularly valuable during periods when
the overall level of trust in financial markets is low. Moreover, an institutional investor
will lower its PWR by over 4pp after she fires a financial adviser who discloses a case
of misconduct. This change is economically significant and does not revert in the three
years after the disclosure. When the perceived value of being honest and trustworthy
increases, investors will prefer firms that are more cautious and that do not overly take
advantage of the regulatory environment.
Finally, my findings contradict Hypothesis 4 - Performance: PWR is unrelated to
excess returns, but negatively related to portfolio alphas: A one standard deviation
increase in PWR is associated with a decrease in portfolio alpha of 0.1pp. Additionally,
there is a positive relationship between PWR and portfolio risk: A one standard deviation
increase in PWR implies a smaller exposure to idiosyncratic risk of 15.3% of a standard
deviation, which supports Hypothesis 5 - Risk.
Overall, there seem to be systematic differences in investors’ preferences for regulatory
WR, which cannot be fully explained by different risk-return profiles: Some investors
appear to not only care about the performance per se, but also about the way this
performance is achieved; particularly so when their trust has been recently broken.
This paper complements the literature that analyzes the interplay between personal
values and investment behavior. Among the first, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) uncover
the existence of “sin” stocks in the market, and Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) find that
political orientation influences investment choices. Gibson and Krueger (2018) examine
the relationship between investors’ horizon and CSR preferences. This study adds to
this literature by showing that there are also more subtle dimensions of investor tastes:
Independent of industry, the degree to which firms exploit regulation also influences
portfolio allocation. Not only what results are achieved, but also how these are achieved
seems to matter to institutional investors.
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2 Sample construction and methodology
First, I show how the proxy for wiggle room (WR) exploitation is constructed and how
it is used to obtain the revealed preferences of institutional investors. Then I present
the methodology for classifying institutional investors and computing their performance
measures. Finally, I briefly describe the control variables. Table 1 contains an overview
of all the variables that are presented in this section. Summary statistics on a firm and
institutional investor level are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The sample used covers the
entire Compustat and I/B/E/S universe for the periods between 1995 and 2017, totalling
over 130,000 firm-year pairs.
- Table 1 -
2.1 Proxying for regulatory wiggle room exploitation
I posit that there are different dimensions along which a firm can exploit regulatory WR
before committing illegalities, amongst which are financial reporting, earnings manage-
ment, and tax planning. Below I discuss the individual proxies and how they capture
“aggressive” and “cautious” firm behavior, i.e., how I identify firms that exploit WR to
a great extent and those that do so only to a small extent.
The extent of detail with which a firm presents its financial results is measured by the
disaggregation quality (DQ) of financial statements proposed by Chen et al. (2015). If
a firm wants to hide poor performance or worrisome positions, it will tend to aggregate
several balance sheet items or income statement lines which reduces DQ. Having a lower
disaggregation quality will capture more aggressive financial reporting practices.
Earnings management (EM) is measured via discretionary accruals, which are the
main mechanism through which firms can artificially improve performance and smooth
earnings. Discretionary accruals are defined as the difference between total (actual) and
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expected accruals. Whilst there are also further ways to manage earning, e.g., changes
in accounting methods, big bath accounting (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) etc., I resort
to discretionary accruals, as they are comparatively easy for an outsider to measure. As
there is no consensus regarding the best model of expected accruals, I follow Eugster and
Wagner (2018) and compute an average of the proxies proposed by Dechow et al. (1995),
Jones (1991), and Kothari et al. (2005). Having larger discretionary accruals will capture
more aggressive earnings management.1
An additional signal of a firm exploiting regulatory WR is when the reported quarterly
earnings barely beat the forecast of analysts. This is captured as Bhojraj et al. (2009)
propose, namely via an indicator for firms that beat the median consensus forecast by no
more than 1 USD cent. The consensus forecast is computed on the basis of the I/B/E/S
unadjusted detail file to control for rounding errors (Payne and Thomas, 2003).
I capture aggressive tax planning activities through different proxies. First, the long-
term cash effective tax rate (CashETR) proposed by Dyreng et al. (2008) measures the
average cash taxes a firm paid over the past five years. A firm that consistently has a
relatively low tax rate is deemed aggressive. Frank et al. (2009) propose an alternative
measure to capture tax aggressiveness: They first compute the expected permanent dif-
ferences in total book taxes and then interpret the residual as discretionary permanent
difference (DTAX). The larger DTAX of a firm is, the more aggressive its tax planning
activities are. I use both measures as the first could be potentially coined as overly sim-
plistic since it does not explicitly identify avoidance activities. The second suffers from
a joint hypothesis problem, as there is no consensus structural model which explains
differences between book and effective tax rates (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010, p. 142).
Finally, firms also have the possibility to move revenues to subsidiaries in tax haven
countries. I capture this corporate practice by retrieving the number of such subsidiaries
1One concern that arises from accrual modelling is the positive correlation between the estimated
abnormal accruals and the firm’s actual accruals (Dechow et al., 2010, p. 358).
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a given firm has from Scott Dyreng’s website (Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009) and scale this
by the logarithm of total assets. The larger this figure is, the more aggressive a firm is
deemed to be.
2.2 Aggregating the individual wiggle room exploitation prox-
ies
It is not ex-ante clear which threshold a firm needs to reach before its behavior can be
classified as either aggressive or cautious. It could be that for each industry there is a
different such cutoff, as various business models allow for different degrees of exploitation.
Additionally, this cutoff is bound to change over time as first, new regulation comes
into force and second, changing conditions and market perceptions make some practices
become warranted. Such time trends can also have a differential impact on firms operating
in different industries. Below I propose a method of aggregating individual proxies that
accounts for these issues.
First, I rank firms within a given industry-year according to each proxy of WR ex-
ploitation and assign to each firm percentile values. The only exceptions are the indicator
for barely beating analysts’ forecasts and the number of subsidiaries in tax haven coun-
tries. The former practice can be considered to be equally questionable across time and
industries. For the latter, I resort to a within-group average as a cutoff, as more than half
of the firm-years have zero subsidiaries in tax haven countries. The main measure for WR
is then computed as a simple average of these percentile rankings and the two indicators.
In this way I obtain a continuous proxy for more or less regulatory exploitation within a
given industry-year: Cautious firms will have small WR and aggressive firms large WR.
In untabulated results I replicate all findings with an alternative measure for WR:
Instead of using a continuous proxy, one can identify aggressive firms by an indicator
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value that uses the 75th percentile as a cutoff.2
Summary statistics of both individual proxies and the wiggle room measures are
presented in Table 2. The distribution of firm-level WR is slightly left skewed and has
almost no excess kurtosis. WR is scaled by construction between 0 and 1. Since data
requirements vary between the different proxies, I can only compute a median number of
4 (out of a total of 6) WR proxies for each firm-year pair. Correlations between individual
proxies are reported in Appendix Table A1 and are surprisingly low, suggesting that the
practices captured are intrinsically different.
- Table 2 -
2.3 The revealed preferences of institutional investors
To extract the revealed preferences of investors, I adapt the methodology developed by
Hwang et al. (2017) and Gibson and Krueger (2018). In a first step, I download the
holdings of institutional investors from Thomson 13F (CDA/Spectrum) database. This
covers quarterly portfolio allocation of all US investors that have assets under manage-
ment in excess of 100,000 USD. My sample starts in 1995Q1 and ends in 2017Q4, totaling
over 150,000 observations.3
I merge the firm-level WR exploitation measure (on average available for 90% of the
quarterly holdings) to the dataset containing holdings of institutional investors. Then,
I compute the weighted average for every quarterly portfolio, which yields the main
measure of interest, exploited portfolio wiggle room, PWR. A higher PWR indicates that
2I also consider extracting principal components of the indicators. This approach is not attractive:
First, using as many as three components would only capture about 50% of the cumulative variation.
Second, the eigenvalues of the components are relatively small, with the largest being close to one.
3WRDS recognized a major issue in the Thomson data feed starting from 2012 and provides researchers
with direct access to the SEC filings of institutional investors. Thus, part of the sample is directly
downloaded from the SEC and then aggregated according to the methodology proposed by WRDS to
emulate the Thomson data.
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an investor is “aggressive”, i.e., that she holds firms in her portfolio that are, on average,
more exploitative.
2.4 Classifying institutional investors
In the first part of the paper, I want to test whether there is a systematic relationship
between investor type and preferences for regulatory wiggle room exploitation. To do so,
I classify investors along several dimension. First, I compute investors’ portfolio duration
(Cremers and Pareek, 2015, p. 1660). This measure captures the weighted average number
of quarters an investor holds a stock in her portfolio over the past five years. I classify
investor horizon as short-term if the portfolio duration in a given quarter is below the 25th
percentile (3.2 quarters), and long-term if it is above the 75th percentile (8.1 quarters).
An alternative, albeit related classification, is obtained by measuring quarterly port-
folio turnover, as discussed in Carhart (1997). This measure captures the percentage of
assets under management that an investor sells or buys (depending on which is smaller)
in a given quarter. It is computed as the absolute value of the minimum of quarterly sales
and buys, divided by the average assets under management in the current and previous
quarter. I differentiate between low and high turnover, i.e., between investors in the top
quartile (below 3.3%) and the last quartile (above 16.5%). Whilst conceptually similar to
duration, turnover is a more transient measure centered around trading behavior, whereas
duration takes an arguably more long-term perspective. The correlation between the two
measures is -55.2% as investors who trade more and have higher turnover also tend to
hold their stocks for a shorter period.
Additionally, I download the investor classifications proposed by Bushee (2001) to
differentiate along legal types and general investment strategies. First, I can distinguish
between banks, corporate and public pension funds, insurance companies, endowments,
and miscellaneous investors. The investment strategy is captured via a cluster analy-
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sis along the dimensions of horizon, turnover, and specialization. Three strategies are
then defined: transient (TRA) investors, with short horizon, high turnover, and high
diversification; dedicated (DED) investors, with long horizon, low turnover, and high
concentration, and quasi-indexers (QIX) with long horizon, low turnover, and high di-
versification (Bushee, 2001, p. 214). The main caveat of this approach is that the vast
majority of investors are classified as quasi-indexers (55.9%) or transient (39.2%). Also,
since the data Bushee provides ends in 2015Q4, I extend the last available classification
to the remaining observations, which may introduce noise in the data.
2.5 Portfolio performance of institutional investors
In the second part of the analysis I want to test whether observed differences in portfolio
wiggle room (PWR) are correlated with heterogeneity in performance. To be able to do
this, I measure portfolio performance and risk respectively via excess quarterly returns
and portfolio alphas, and via exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
Since I observe only quarterly snapshots of the asset allocation of institutional in-
vestors, I assume that all trades occur at the end of a given quarter. Raw portfolio
returns are the weighted average of returns generated by the end-of-quarter holdings.
This approach is routinely used in the literature but ignores all trades that occur within
a quarter. However, at least for the subset of mutual funds, the resulting return differen-
tial is close to zero (Kacperczyk et al., 2008, p. 2380). To obtain excess portfolio returns
I subtract the quarterly treasury rate from the raw returns and then winsorize at the 1%
level.
I control for both exposure to the quarterly returns of the 3-factor (Fama and French,
1996) and the 5-factor (Fama and French, 2015) Fama-French (FF) portfolios. This
is done via an overlapping rolling window regression over the past 12 quarters with
factor returns downloaded from the website of Kenneth French. Quarterly alphas are
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the intercept of these regressions. I compute idiosyncratic risk exposure as the standard
deviation of the residuals of the FF regressions (Ang et al., 2006, p. 283).
2.6 Control variables
To account for possible confounding effects I control for several variables: the logarithm
of assets under management, the logarithm of the number of different stocks in the quar-
terly holdings, an indicator variable for holdings focusing on no more than two different
industries, and the number of quarters an investor is in the sample. All regressions also
account for time-invariant factors through quarter fixed effects. The observations are
likely to exhibit correlation both across time on the individual institutional investor level
and in the cross-section since during any given quarter all investors hold stocks from the
same universe (Seasholes and Zhu, 2010, p. 1989). Therefore, it is crucial to allow for
multi-way clustering of standard errors in the empirical tests which is done following the
approach proposed by Cameron et al. (2011).
Moreover, for each quarterly portfolio allocation, I compute the weighted average of
the managerial ability (MA) variable downloaded from Peter Demerjian’s website. This
captures the efficiency, relative to a given industry, with which a firm converts corporate
resources into revenues after controlling for several firm characteristics (Demerjian et al.,
2012, p. 1237). In unreported analyses, I find that on the firm-level, managerial ability and
wiggle room exploitation appear to be positively related. The direction of the relationship
could go both ways: Aggressive firms could be more efficient than their peers because
they exploit regulatory wiggle room. Alternatively, the managers of efficient firms could
be better able and willing to exploit WR more aggressively. The authors show that
MA reflects to a large extent characteristics that are attributable to the firm’s CEO
(Demerjian et al., 2012, p. 1230) which suggests that there may be a common underlying
driving both MA and WR exploitation.
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2.7 Summary statistics
Summary statistics for all variables at an institutional investor level are presented in
Table 3. I observe the average investor for about 55 quarters. Exploited PWR is on
average 43% and has a standard deviation of 6%. The distribution exhibits an excess
kurtosis of about 5, which implies that there are several investors that shift their holdings
respectively towards aggressive and cautious firms.
- Table 3 -
In Figure 1 I explore whether there have been any time trends in the preferences of
institutional investors for regulatory wiggle room exploitation. I plot both the average
investor-level PWR and the average firm-level WR. It appears that overall, institutional
investors tend to hold firms that are more aggressive than the average. This tendency has
been disappearing, as the spread between average PWR and firm-level WR started nar-
rowing after 2001. A possible explanation for this reversal is that following the adoption
of regulation Fair Disclosure in August 2010, institutional investors lost their preferential
access to insider information and had to rely on publicly available information instead
(Ke et al., 2008). This, in turn, could have made more cautious and transparent firms
more attractive.
- Figure 1 -
3 Heterogeneity of preferences for portfolio wiggle
room
In this section, I examine whether institutional investors exhibit heterogeneity in their
preferences for regulatory wiggle room exploitation and look at why this could be the case.
14
Exploiting regulatory wiggle room to a great extent could make a firm less transparent,
more likely to get involved in corporate scandals and illegal behavior, and reduce the
amount of trust that employees have for its management.
I posit that these potential implications will matter more to some investors than to
others. I hypothesize that this effect will be systematically related to investors’ character-
istics, namely heterogeneity in the need for transparency, in fiduciary duties, and in the
value investors place on trustworthiness. To see whether this is the case, I study differ-
ences in preferences for wiggle room exploitation along investment horizons and trading
behavior, as well as along the legal types of investors and their general investment strate-
gies. Finally, I use the disclosure of financial adviser misconduct as an exogenous shock
to investors’ preferences. After such events, the importance of trust will become salient
and the exposed investors will place a higher value on trustworthiness.
3.1 Investment horizon and portfolio turnover
Previous research has argued that, overall, institutional investors prefer holding firms with
higher disclosure quality, because by doing so the liquidity of their holdings improves and
information asymmetries decrease which reduces overall transaction costs (Diamond and
Verrecchia, 1991). However, this channel will matter less to investors that have a long-
term horizon and trade less. These investors will have more opportunities to interact with
firms’ management and gather private information which will give them a comparative
advantage over less informed traders (Edmans and Manso, 2011, p. 2396). Short-term
investors and frequent traders will be more concerned about the ease with which informa-
tion can be obtained and the transaction costs caused by their trades (Boone and White,
2015, p. 509). Since aggressively exploiting wiggle room will make firms less transparent,
I expect the PWR of investors to be positively correlated with investment horizon and
negatively correlated with turnover (Hypothesis 1 - Transparency).
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I test this in Table 4 by respectively regressing quarterly PWR on an indicator for
short- and long-term investment horizon and on one for high and low portfolio turnover.
The models (1) and (4) include only the baseline regressions that control for assets un-
der management, portfolio diversification, number of quarters a given investor is in the
sample, and exposure to the FF 3-factor portfolios. The average exploited PWR of the
benchmark categories for horizon is 42.6% and for turnover it is 42.8%. The coefficients
reveal that investors with a short-term horizon and a high turnover have a PWR about




). This means that short-term and
high turnover investors tend to prefer firms that are more cautious; both these findings
support Hypothesis 1 - Transparency. The coefficients of the control variables are in line
with expectations: Higher exposure to the high-minus-low, market, and small-minus-big
portfolios is associated with smaller PWR. This is first because firms that are smaller tend
to exploit wiggle room less. Second, the market average of exploited WR is smaller than
that of institutional investors’ portfolios. Therefore, increasing exposure to the market
will correlate to a reduction in PWR. The proxies for investor size and specialization are
(mostly) insignificant.
Models (2) and (5) additionally control for the volatility of the individual investors’
PWR, as it could be that the average stability of PWR is inherently linked to its level. The
results are almost identical to the previous columns. In models (3) and (6) the weighted
portfolio average of the holdings’ managerial ability (MA) is included. First, MA is
positively correlated with PWR: a standard deviation increase in average portfolio MA
increases PWR by 1.4% when holding investor horizon and portfolio turnover constant.
Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients on investment horizon and portfolio turnover
decreases because there is a positive association between MA and horizon and a negative
one between MA and turnover: Investors that hold firms in their portfolio that have on
average high managerial ability tend to also have longer horizons and to trade less.
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- Table 4 -
In unreported analyses, I test whether the relationship between the preferences for
PWR and investment horizon remains significant when portfolio turnover is included in
the regression. I find that the coefficient of the long-term dummy remains significant and
similar in size while that of the short-term dummy becomes insignificant. This suggests
that long-term investors prefer more aggressive firms because they are better able to
gather insider information which gives them a comparative advantage. It seems that
trading activity is the main reason why short-term investors prefer more cautious firms.
Finally, including the continuous measures for investment horizon and portfolio turnover
instead of dummies leaves the results unchanged. When I additionally control for turnover
squared, it has a positive coefficient: The same decrease in trading intensity is associated
with a much larger increase in PWR when the reference point is a low turnover portfolio
than it would be the case for a high turnover portfolio. It seems that decreasing PWR
beyond a certain point will not yield additional informational benefits.
3.2 Legal type and strategy
Previous research has found that several of the firm-level proxies that I use to construct
the measure of exploited wiggle room are associated with illegal firm practices: Aggres-
sive earnings management and just beating analysts’ forecasts are both an indicator for
“suspect firms”, i.e., firms that are more likely to engage in financial reporting fraud (Big-
gerstaff et al., 2015, pp.107-110). Moreover, O’Donovan et al. (2018) exploit the 2016
leak of the Panama Papers to show that subsidiaries in tax haven countries are associated
with both bribery and tax evasion. I therefore posit that firms that exploit regulatory
wiggle room to a large extent could be more likely to get involved in illegal activities or
corporate scandals. I hypothesize that one channel that explains investors’ preferences
towards more or less aggressive firms is their legal type. This is because the standards
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of prudence that regulatory authorities require from institutional investors are heteroge-
neous: Banks have the most stringent ones, followed by pension funds, and lastly mutual
funds and other investment advisers who are relatively unconstrained (Del Guercio, 1996,
pp. 33-36). I expect investors with more stringent fiduciary duties to be more concerned
about the possibility of litigation and therefore to prefer firms that exploit regulatory
wiggle room less (Hypothesis 2 - Scrutiny).
I test this hypothesis in Table 5, where in columns (1) to (3) PWR is regressed
on a dummy for investor’s legal type using miscellaneous investors as the benchmark.
Model (1) indicates that most legal types do not exhibit significant differences when
compared to miscellaneous investors. Only banks tend to hold portfolios of firms that are
significantly more aggressive. This contradicts Hypothesis 2 - Scrutiny, as it suggests that
having stronger fiduciary duties does not correlate with a preference for more cautious
firms. It could be that banks have an informational advantage when compared to other
institutional investors, and therefore also tend to hold firms that are less transparent. If
so, this additionally supports Hypothesis 1 - Transparency.
Model (2) additionally controls for the volatility of PWR which has little impact
on the magnitude of the coefficients. Model (3) also controls for portfolio MA, which
absorbs much of the variation in PWR amongst legal investor types. Moreover, the
positive correlation between MA and PWR also persists within a given legal type. The
size of the dummy coefficients for banks and public pension funds decreases, which points
towards a positive correlation between those types of investors and portfolio MA.
It is likely that the general investment strategy of investors will also influence their
preferences for regulatory wiggle room exploitation. Transient investors have a short hori-
zon and are focused on achieving short-term trading profits. For them the considerations
of Hypothesis 1 - Transparency apply, as they will presumably benefit from the additional
transparency that holding cautious firms provides. Quasi-indexers have a long-term per-
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spective and follow a diversified and passive investment approach. Since their discretion
in selecting stocks is limited, I expect them to have the weakest preferences for wiggle
room and thus use them as the benchmark category for the following analyses. Dedicated
investors also have a long-term horizon, but their strategy is consistent with a “relation-
ship investing” role, as they provide stable capital to a small number of firms (Bushee,
2001, p.214). The preferences of dedicated investors could either be geared towards more
aggressive and thus less transparent firms, consistent with Hypothesis 1 - Transparency,
or inclined towards the more cautious firms with allegedly more trustworthy management.
This could occur because the managers of cautious firms are considered honest by the
employees, which is crucial for a relationship based on trust to develop (O’Neill, 2002).
Such a relationship is likely to increase employee satisfaction (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002),
which in turn generates long-term value (Edmans, 2011). Additionally, trustworthy man-
agers are particularly important when one follows a strategy of relationship investing,
as is the case for dedicated investors. Therefore, I expect them to prefer cautious firms
(Hypothesis 3 - Trust).
I test these hypotheses in models (4) to (6) of Table 5, where exploited PWR is
regressed on a dummy for investor strategy using quasi-indexers as benchmark. The
average exploited PWR of the benchmark is 43.3%. The coefficients show that transient
investors tend to hold firms that exploit 2% less regulatory wiggle room than quasi-
indexers (−0.009
0.433
), confirming Hypothesis 1 - Transparency. Also, the findings support
Hypothesis 3 - Trust, as the exploited PWR of dedicated investors is on average 7%
smaller than that of quasi-indexers (−0.028
0.433
).
To corroborate the claim that only the preferences of transient investors are motivated
by differences in trading activity, I control for both portfolio turnover and investment hori-
zon. The coefficient of the transient investors becomes insignificant, which indicates that
the driver behind the observed relationship is linked with trading behavior. The coeffi-
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cient of the dedicated investors remains unchanged and highly significant. This points
towards the importance of the “relationship investing” channel: Instead of preferring the
less transparent firms and profit from their long investment horizon to gain an informa-
tional advantage, these investors prefer firms that are more cautious and trustworthy.
- Table 5 -
3.3 Financial adviser misconduct and changes in PWR
If an investor who values trust prefers cautious firms because they appear more trust-
worthy, then a change in the perceived importance of trust should also induce a change
in the revealed preferences for regulatory wiggle room exploitation. To test whether this
is the case, I use the disclosure of financial adviser misconduct (Egan et al., 2018a,b) as
a quasi-exogenous shock to investors’ preferences. The relationship between an institu-
tional investor and her financial advisers is based on trust: The latter plays the role of
a “money doctor” who is not only employed, but also trusted by the investor who seeks
advice on how to best make risky investment decisions (Gennaioli et al., 2015, p. 92).
When this trust is breached, its importance will become salient and the exposed investor
will be more cautious in choosing the right advisers (Gurun et al., 2017). If Hypothe-
sis 3 - Trust holds, investors for whom trust is important will also exhibit low PWR. But
then a shock to the perceived importance of trust will translate into a change in PWR. I
posit that the exposure to financial misconduct can be seen as such a shock and expect
it to cause a decrease in PWR, after controlling for a change that occurs at a similar
investor who does not experience misconduct. The effect ought to be strongest following
disclosures that lead to the firing of the financial adviser, as such reaction suggests that
the disclosure did indeed represent a breach of the investor’s trust.
The validity of the identification strategy would be threatened if unaffected institu-
tional investors would themselves impose stricter internal controls as a consequence of
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seeing competitors punishing misconduct. However, this seems unlikely since the finan-
cial consequences for the affected firm are usually mild. The median amount for which
the misconduct cases are settled lies at USD 40,000 (Egan et al., 2018a, p. 11), i.e., 0.01%
of the assets the median investor manages. Moreover, institutional investors employ on
average over 150 different advisers. Even if a competitor becomes informed of the ongoing
misconduct investigation, it is likely that it will appear to her as an isolated case that
does not warrant a change in her own organization. Another concern is that some insti-
tutional investors may find out about the adviser’s misconduct before it is disclosed and
that they would already have reacted by the time the malpractice was public. However,
this should bias against finding a significant effect.
Empirical framework - Estimation of treatment effects
To assess the consequences of misconduct I focus on the sub-sample of institutional in-
vestors that employ advisers that are registered with the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA). FINRA requires for all registered financial advisers to report their
entire employment and disclosure histories, including all customer disputes and disci-
plinary events. These reports are then made publicly available, and were used by Egan
et al. (2018a) to construct a panel of yearly adviser observations that contains both their
current employer and their track record of regulatory disclosures.4 I collapse this panel
at the employing firm level to obtain a measure of how many misconduct disclosures a
given firm experiences over a year. I then manually match all firms in this data set with
Thomson 13F and keep only the matching institutions. This results in over 18,000 yearly
observations of 2,500 institutional investors over the period from 2007 to 2015. Appendix
Table A2 shows that there are only minor differences between the full and matched sam-
ples: Compared to the full sample, the average investor in the matched sample has an
4I am very grateful to Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru for sharing the data with me.
Additional information can be found at eganmatvosseru.com.
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investment horizon that is 0.5 quarters longer, a turnover that is 2 percentage points
smaller, and 7% fewer assets under management. Also, investment advisers make up a
larger part of the matched sample (92%) than of the full sample (79%).
I define the treatment group as all institutional investors who employ financial advisers
who disclose misconduct cases during a given year. I differentiate between three types
of treatment: “All”, which covers investors who experience between 1 and 10 disclosures
of any kind during a given year, “Criminal”, which covers only disclosures of criminal
charges, and “Fired”, which covers only disclosures that lead to the termination of the
employment relation between adviser and investor. This yields respectively a total of
323, 81, and 139 treatment observations. Appendix Figure A1 plots the total number
of advisers employed by year together with the fraction that reports misconduct. While
there is a steady increase in the total number of advisers employed, the fraction that
reports a misconduct event during a given year remains largely constant. To assess the
magnitude of the treatment effect, I compute the total change of PWR during a year,
∆PWRT , and retain only one observation for each investor-year.
Since treatment assignment is unlikely to be random, I construct a control group rely-
ing on nearest neighbor propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This
ought to ensure that the treatment and control groups are statistically indistinguishable
along observables. To achieve this, I control for investor characteristics observed dur-
ing the last quarter (or year) before treatment occurs. Specifically I account for the
#Advisers that are employed by a given investor, the average qualification exams passed
by them, ∅Exam 63, ∅Exam 65, and ∅Exam 66, their average years of experience as
advisers, ∅Experience, and whether the firm employs investors that were fired in the
past due to a misconduct allegation. I also control for several variables that account for
differences in investment strategies and that are potentially correlated with the outcome
of interest: Portfolio turnover and duration, exposure to the FF-3 factor portfolios, an
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indicator for investors who experienced a loss in the previous quarter, the logarithm of
assets under management, and of the number of portfolio firms. Appendix Table A3
shows logit regressions of treatment assignment on investor characteristics. The coeffi-
cients have the expected signs, and the most sizable impact on the probability of being
treated is attributable to employing advisers that were previously fired as a consequence
of misconduct. This is in line with findings in Egan et al. (2018a) and also with Dimmock
et al. (2018) who show that financial advisers who engaged in fraudulent behavior will
also influence their future co-workers towards malpractice.
Appendix Table A4 reports the means of the covariates in the treatment and control
samples, together with a test for differences. While the two groups are not perfectly bal-
anced for the “Any” treatment, they are for the “Fired” treatment, which also represents
the main case of interest. Propensity score estimates are constructed following Abadie
and Imbens (2006, 2016) and standard errors are adjusted to account for the fact that the
scores themselves are estimates and not observed. Finally, to compute the average treat-
ment effects on the variable of interest, ∆PWRT , I match treated and control investors
following the nearest neighbor technique. In unreported analyses, I use an alternative
estimation strategy for the propensity score proposed by Imbens and Rubin (2015). This
methodology leads to the inclusion of 8 linear covariates and 19 interaction terms. The
results remain robust to this specification, and the overlap is not overly improved.
Main findings - Financial adviser misconduct and changes in PWR
Table 6 shows the effect of the different treatment types on exploited portfolio wiggle
room. In model (1) I consider all misconduct disclosures. Here the effect on PWR is
negative but insignificant. This may be because I do not distinguish between different
treatment intensities: A minor misconduct case that is settled for a few thousand dollars
is unlikely to generate any serious consequence. The coefficients in models (2) and (3)
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are both negative and significant. For example, being exposed to a misconduct allega-
tion which leads to the firing of the culprit is related to a reduction in PWR of over 4
percentage points over the treatment year. This is an economically sizeable effect, rep-
resenting 0.52 standard deviations of ∆PWRT . In models (4) to (6), I examine whether
this effect is observable before treatment and if it vanishes afterward. First, there is no
significant change in PWR in the one year prior. This suggests that investors do not react
to malpractices before the allegations are publicly disclosed. The coefficient in the year
after treatment is somewhat smaller but still negative and significant. Two years after
treatment, the effect is not significant anymore but the coefficient remains negative. This
suggests that it is likely that the observed effects are not only a short-lived overreaction to
the increased salience of fraud (Bondt and Thaler, 1985), but rather that they represent
a persistent shift in investors’ preferences.
- Table 6 -
Figure 2 further explores how the effect evolves through time by depicting the esti-
mated average treatment effect from three periods before to three periods after the mis-
conduct allegations are disclosed. Panel 2a confirms that there is no significant change in
PWR when one does not differentiate between the seriousness of the misconduct cases.
Panel 2b provides additional evidence that when one considers only disclosures that lead
to the firing of the adviser, the PWR of the treated institutional investor significantly
decreases and that this decrease is persistent. Additionally, the fact that there are no
observable effects before treatment points out that institutional investors usually do not
anticipate the misconduct disclosures.
- Figure 2 -
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Drivers of changes in PWR following financial adviser misconduct
What are the main drivers behind the observed decrease in PWR? In general, the portfolio
wiggle room of an institutional investor decreases when she (i) buys firms that are more
cautious or (ii) sells firms that are more aggressive than the firms she currently holds,
or (iii) when the firms she holds become themselves more cautious. To see whether
this is the case I construct portfolios consisting of those shares that an investor buys,
sells, and does not trade during a quarter. For each of these portfolios, I then compute
the portfolio wiggle room: PWRbuys, for the shares, bought, PWRinit, for the initiating
trades, PWRsells, for the shares sold, and PWRexit for the stocks exited during a quarter.
The obtain the outcome variables of interest, I subtract from all these measures the initial
PWR of the investor and sum up the available quarters over a year. Finally, I compute
the change in the aggressiveness of portfolio firms by keeping the holdings constant but
looking at the lagged wiggle room of the firms. ∆PWRnoTrade is then the % difference
between the investor’s current PWR and the PWR she would have had the previous
quarter if she did not rebalance her holdings.
In Table 7 I estimate the average treatment effect that experiencing financial adviser
misconduct has on these measures. I report only the coefficient for the main treatment
of interest, namely the one that causes the financial adviser to be fired. The first model
presents the total change in PWR for the year of treatment. The coefficient in model
(2) is negative and significant: Treated investor tend to buy shares of firms that are
more cautious than the ones they currently hold in their portfolios. The insignificant
coefficient of the initiating trades portfolio in model (3) suggests that investors do not
buy stakes in cautious firms they do not already hold in their portfolios. Instead they
seem to allocate more capital to existing cautious holdings. While the coefficient in model
(4) is insignificant, model (5) shows that treated investor tend to exit firms that are more
aggressive than the ones they currently hold in their portfolios. Finally, the coefficient
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of ∆PWRnoTradeT is negative and significant. This implies that the trading activity of
investors is not the only driver behind the observed changes in PWR. What also matters
is the change in firms’ behavior with respect to regulatory wiggle room exploitation: The
firms that are held by the treated investors become more cautious during the treatment
year.
- Table 7 -
Taken together these findings provide further evidence that supports Hypothesis 3 -
Trust and highlight the important consequences of breaking the investor’s trust (Lins
et al., 2017). When the perceived value of being honest and trustworthy increases in-
vestors will prefer firms that are more cautious and that do not excessively take advantage
of the regulatory environment.
4 Performance and risk implications of PWR
As it turns out that institutional investors differ significantly with respect to their pref-
erences for wiggle room exploitation, I now address the second question of this paper,
namely whether having such preferences affects portfolio performance and exposure to
idiosyncratic risk. Figure 3 depicts the main findings of this section, namely a negative
relationship between PWR and portfolio alpha and a positive one between PWR and
exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
- Figure 3
4.1 Excess returns and portfolio alphas
As it turns out that institutional investors differ significantly with respect to their pref-
erences for wiggle room exploitation, I now address the second question of this paper,
26
namely whether having such preferences affects portfolio performance and exposure to
idiosyncratic risk. Figure 3 depicts the main findings of this section, namely a negative
relationship between PWR and portfolio alpha and a positive one between PWR and
exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
I test this hypothesis in Table 8, where in model (1) excess returns are regressed on
PWR, the full set of controls from the previous tables, and investors’ exposure to the 3
factor Fama-French portfolios. Model (2) also accounts for differences in investment hori-
zon and portfolio turnover, and model (3) includes instead general investment strategy.
In columns (4) to (6), I perform the same analyses using portfolio alpha as dependent
variable. The coefficients on the first three models are negative but insignificant, which
indicates that there is no meaningful relationship between preferences for wiggle room
exploitation and excess returns. However, the coefficients of the last three models are
all negative and significant contradicting Hypothesis 4 - Performance: A one standard
deviation increase in PWR implies a decrease in alpha of 0.1% or 0.06 standard devia-
tions. Appendix Table A5 confirms these findings when controlling for exposure to the
returns on the FF 5-factor portfolios. There seemingly is a negative relationship between
preferences for wiggle room exploitation and portfolio performance: When an investor
holds aggressive firms, she tends to generate smaller portfolio alphas.
- Table 8 -
4.2 Exposure to idiosyncratic risk
Firms that fully exploit regulatory wiggle room could have more opportunities available to
conceal poor performance and smooth earnings. Aggressive firms could avoid a short-lived
negative price impact on the stock price by barely beating analysts’ forecasts (Bhojraj
et al., 2009). Moreover, the literature has shown that firms manage earnings in order
to reduce fluctuations in reported net income (Trueman and Titman, 1988, p. 127).
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Therefore, it could be the case that an investor who has a preference for aggressive firms
will generate quarterly returns that are less volatile. I expect to see a negative relationship
between PWR and measures for portfolio risk (Hypothesis 5 - Risk).
I test this in Table 9, where I regress the exposure to idiosyncratic risk of investors’
returns on PWR and the set of controls from the previous tables. The results confirm
Hypothesis 5 - Risk : Model (1) shows that a one standard deviation increase in PWR is
associated with a decrease in idiosyncratic risk exposure of 18% of a standard deviation
(0.05∗0.07
0.02
). Models (2) and (3) show that this relationship remains significant and retains
most of its magnitude after controlling for the volatility of PWR and MA. To see whether
this association is caused by differences in investment horizon, portfolio turnover, or
general strategy, I sequentially control for these characteristics in models (4) and (5) and
find the same association within a specific investor group. Finally, Appendix Table A6
confirms that these relationships continue to hold when risk measures are computed by
taking the exposures to the 5-factor FF portfolios into account.
Taken together, the findings point towards a negative correlation between PWR and
portfolio risk: Having a preference towards holding firms that exploit regulatory wiggle
room does decrease portfolio alphas but reduces exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
- Table 9 -
5 Further analyses
In this section, I perform additional analyses and robustness tests. First, I explore
whether the relationship between investors’ preferences for regulatory wiggle exploita-
tion and portfolio performance is due to a single proxy or rather due to the common
factor captured by the PWR measure. Then I ask if market factors correlate with the
preferences of institutional investors in a way that is consistent with my hypotheses.
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5.1 Portfolio performance and individual wiggle room proxies
It could be the case that the relationship between exploiting regulatory wiggle room
and portfolio performance is driven by a single proxy instead of capturing the effect of
their common component. For instance, the positive correlation between PWR and the
volatility of portfolio returns could be exclusively attributable to the effects of earnings
management (Trueman and Titman, 1988). I test this in Table 10, where I regress the
measures of portfolio performance and risk on the complete set of proxies for exploited
wiggle room.
Models (1) and (2) indicate that the coefficients of the individual proxies are all
insignificant when excess returns are used as the dependent variable. This is in line with
the insignificant relationship between excess returns and PWR found in Table 8. Models
(3) and (4) depict a more nuanced relationship between the individual WR components
and portfolio alpha. A portfolio that consists of firms that exploit tax credits more
aggressively, and thus have smaller long-term tax rates, tends to generate higher alphas:
A one standard deviation increase in CashETR is associated with an increase in portfolio
alpha of 60% of a standard deviation (0.16∗0.07
0.02
). This is consistent with evidence that
some institutional investors actively engage with portfolio firms to make them plan taxes
more efficiently and exploit the available tax credits (Cheng et al., 2012, p. 1494). The
coefficient of DTAX is insignificant but also positive. The number of subsidiaries in tax
haven countries that the firm has is associated with lower portfolio alphas: A one standard
deviation increase in #tax havens relates to a decrease in portfolio alpha of 7.9 standard
deviations (−0.03∗5.23
0.02
). This is consistent with managers effectively using tax havens to
derive private benefits to the detriment of noncontrolling shareholders (Bennedsen and
Zeume, 2018, p. 1222). All other proxies have negative but insignificant coefficients.
- Table 10 -
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In Appendix Table A7 I perform the same analysis but controlling for exposure to
the FF-5 portfolios (Fama and French, 2015). Models (1) and (2) confirm the previous
results as all coefficients of interest are insignificant. Models (3) and (4) are also mainly
in line with the previous findings. In addition to those, the negative coefficient of DQ
becomes significant at the 10% level: A one standard deviation increase in the disag-
gregation quality is associated with a decrease in portfolio alpha of 3.7% of a standard
deviation (−0.01∗0.11
0.03
). This is in line with evidence suggesting that managers avoid re-
vealing information of poorly performing business segments via aggregation of financial
statements (Berger and Hann, 2007, p. 871). The coefficient of earnings management
becomes positive and significant: A one standard deviation increase in EM is associated
with an increase in portfolio alpha of 8.8% of a standard deviation (0.012∗0.22
0.03
). This is
consistent with the potentially positive effects of earnings management on firm value, for
instance by helping firms to maintain a high stock valuation (Shleifer, 2004, p. 416).
In models (5) and (6) I study the relationship between portfolio risk and the individual
WR proxies. The coefficients of DQ, just beat, and #tax havens are all negative and
highly significant which is in line with the overall effect of portfolio wiggle room. Holding
firms that report financial statement parsimoniously, barely beat analysts’ forecasts, and
have several subsidiaries in tax haven countries tends to decrease the volatility of portfolio
returns and the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. A one standard deviation increase in DQ
is related to a decrease in idiosyncratic risk of 18.2% of a standard deviation (−0.013∗0.28
0.02
).
These figures for barely beating analysts forecasts and #tax havens are 28% and 445%





The coefficients of CashETR and EM are also highly significant but positive: A
one standard deviation increase in these proxies respectively relates to an increase in




). This suggests that holding
firms that manage earnings more and pay relatively fewer taxes is correlated with larger
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exposure to idiosyncratic risk. This is consistent with the evidence on big bath accounting,
i.e., when managers prefer frequent small gains and rare large losses to more frequent,
albeit smaller losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). In models (5) and (6) of Appendix
Table A7 I also control for the exposure to the FF-5 factor portfolios. The magnitude of
the coefficients remains similar and their signs do not change.
Taken together, these findings highlight the relative importance of the individual
proxies for exploiting regulatory wiggle room. Moreover, it seems that the relationship
one observes when analyzing the joint effect of portfolio wiggle room cannot be subsumed
by only looking at a subset of these proxies.
5.2 Sentiment, market uncertainty, and preferences for PWR
Previous literature argues that changes in market sentiment that occur over time affect
stock prices in a heterogeneous manner, as sentiment-based demand shocks vary across
firms. Due to both the trading of irrational investors who temporarily emphasize growth
over profitability, and to market frictions that impose limits on arbitrageurs, the demand
for “more speculative securities” will increase. Such securities are broadly characterized
by being difficult to value objectively (Baker and Wurgler, 2007, pp. 131-132). If Hy-
pothesis 1 - Transparency holds, firms that exploit more regulatory wiggle room are
also less transparent which in turn makes them more speculative. If the institutional
investors themselves are subject to the effects of sentiment either directly or indirectly
(through limits of arbitrage or the preferences of their customers), I expect to find a pos-
itive relationship between market sentiment and PWR. I also expect the strength of this
relationship to vary across investor types: For short-term, high turnover, and transient
investors market sentiment will play less of a role compared to the respective benchmarks.
This could possibly be due to the fact that those types of investors are closer in nature
to arbitrageurs that would profit from mispricings rather than modify their holdings.
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To test this, I download the monthly orthogonalized market sentiment index from
Jeffrey Wurgler’s website and compute the average for each quarter (Baker and Wurgler,
2006). I then interact this with dummies for institutional investor type, namely invest-
ment horizon, portfolio turnover, and general strategy. I regress exploited PWR on these
variables and the full set of controls in Table 11. In all models I find a positive and
highly significant relationship between PWR and investor sentiment: Regardless of the
benchmark category, a one standard deviation increase in sentiment is associated with an
increase in exploited PWR of 11.5% of a standard deviation (0.009∗0.64
0.05
). When sentiment
is interacted with horizon, I find a negative additional effect on short-term investor: Hav-
ing a short average portfolio duration more than halves the impact of sentiment on PWR,
which hints that short-term investors tend to be less affected by upsprings in market sen-
timent. In model (2) I also find a negative, albeit smaller, coefficient on the interaction
between sentiment and high turnover, which is in line with the previous point. In model
(3) it seems that there is no additional effect of a given general strategy. However, none
of these effects is large enough to reverse the overall positive correlation between market
sentiment and exploited PWR, which confirms Hypothesis 1 - Transparency.
It could be that due to their structural characteristics some institutional investors
will react slowly to changes in market sentiment. In Table A8 I explore this by using as
explanatory variable the average sentiment of the previous quarter. The results remain
mostly unchanged, but the interaction coefficient of low turnover becomes significant at
the 10% confidence level. This suggests that these investors are indeed more affected by
sentiment, but require more time to rebalance their holdings.
An additional channel through which market factors relate to investors’ preferences for
wiggle room exploitation could be the degree of market uncertainty: When it surpasses
a critical threshold, investors may be forced to liquidate their assets in fire sales (Shleifer
and Vishny, 2011) causing a “flight to quality within the stock market” (Baker and
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Wurgler, 2007, p.133). If Hypothesis 3 - Trust holds, I expect institutional investors to
prefer holding firms that are more cautious when market uncertainty is very high. This is
because these firms may have accumulated more credibility (Eugster and Wagner, 2018)
which could be particularly valuable in times of high uncertainty (Lins et al., 2017).
To test this I download the monthly time-series of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX)
and compute the average over a given quarter. I identify periods of high uncertainty
by including VIX squared as an additional explanatory variable. Models (4) to (6) of
Table 11 show regressions of PWR on these variables and the complete set of controls. The
coefficient on the average VIX level suggests that during normal times there is a positive
relationship between preferences for wiggle room exploitation and market uncertainty: A
one standard deviation (7.7) increase in VIX is related to an increase in PWR of 34.3%
of a standard deviation (≃ 7.7
0.05
∗ (0.003 − 2 ∗ 7.7 ∗ 4.5 ∗ 10−5)). However, when market
volatility surpasses a critical point, this relationship is reversed: When the VIX is larger
than 33 (≃ 0.003
2∗4.5∗10−5
), any further increase will be related to a smaller PWR.5 This
finding supports Hypothesis 3 - Trust, as investors seem to prefer more cautious firms
when market conditions are uncertain, suggesting that being trustworthy is particularly
valuable during turbulent times.
- Table 11 -
In untabulated analyses, I explore the interaction effect between market uncertainty
and the investor type. I find that when an investor has a short-term horizon or a high
portfolio turnover the effect of market uncertainty will become smaller. For investors
with low turnover, the impact of the VIX will be magnified. This is again consistent
with the idea of frequent traders being somewhat less subject to the influences of market
conditions.
5During the height of the financial crises, the VIX surpassed 80.
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6 Conclusion
In the first part of this paper, I analyze the holdings of institutional investors through
a novel perspective: The inclination towards holding firms that exploit more or less of
the available regulatory wiggle room. I ask whether some investors are concerned about
additional aspects other than performance, namely whether it matters to them how results
are achieved and uncover substantial heterogeneity amongst investor types. Short-term
investors, frequent traders, and dedicated institutions hold firms that are more cautious
towards exploiting the available regulatory wiggle room. This could be related to the
additional transparency and trustworthiness of cautious firms. In support of this I find
that when market sentiment increases and investors usually prefer more opaque firms,
they also tend to prefer firms that aggressively exploit the regulatory wiggle room.
There seems to be a link between the perceived value of trust and investors’ preferences
for WR. When an investor fires a financial adviser following the disclosure of misconduct,
she will thereafter significantly reduce her portfolio wiggle room compared to a similar
investor whose trust was not breached. This reduction is economically significant and
is not reversed in the three following years. Moreover, it seems to be driven by both
portfolio rebalancing activities and by changes that occur at the level of the portfolio
firms. Hence, a plausibly exogenous shock to an investor’s preferences leads her to change
the aggressiveness with which her portfolio firms exploit the regulatory environment.
In the second part, I ask whether having such preferences impacts investors’ perfor-
mance. It seems that holding firms that fully exploit wiggle room does generate somewhat
smaller portfolio alphas after controlling for exposures to the FF-3 or FF-5 factor port-
folios. However, holding such firms significantly reduces exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
This could be related to aggressive firms using regulatory wiggle room to smoothen their
performance. I also examine the relative importance of the individual proxies and cannot
attribute the established relationship to any single one of them.
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Overall, this paper documents the presence of a heterogeneity in investors’ prefer-
ences for the exploitation of regulatory wiggle room which cannot be fully explained by
differences in risk-return profiles. It then shows how a change in investors’ preferences
can have a substantial impact on their investment decisions. This finding is of interest as
it identifies a further channel through which firms that refrain from exploiting regulation
could be rewarded, namely by better access to capital from investors who value trust
highly.
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Figure 1: Time series of mean exploited WR on the firm- and investor-level
The figure depicts the time series evolution of the mean exploited WR across all insti-
tutional investors (PWR mean) and the mean exploited WR across all Compustat firms
(WR mean). Both variables are winsorized at the 5% level. All variables are described
in in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Changes in PWR around financial adviser misconduct
The figure depicts the average treatment effect that employing an adviser who discloses
misconduct has on PWR. In the first panel, treatment is any type of disclosed miscon-
duct. In the second panel, treatment are the disclosers that cause the adviser’s firing.
Coefficients are obtained via nearest neighbor propensity score matching. The control
group is estimated using year dummies and several investor characteristics. The sample
spans from 2007 to 2015 and covers all institutional investors for which a match with
FINRA’s BrokerCheck can be established. All variables are described in Table 1. Robust















































Figure 3: PWR and exposure to idiosyncratic risk
The figure depicts a scatter plot of exploited PWR and measures of portfolio performance,
namely quarterly portfolio alphas and exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Both panels control
for investor characteristics, time (quarter) fixed effects, and exposure to FF-3 factor
portfolios. PWR and the performance measures are winsorized at the 5% level. The
sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio holdings of
institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available. All variables
are described in Table 1.
(a) Portfolio alpha (b) Exposure to idiosyncratic risk
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Table 1: Variable definitions
Panel A: Institutional investor level variables
#Advisers Total number of financial advisers employed by an institutional investor during a year Egan et al.
(2018a)
DED Dedicated investors, i.e., those that have a long-term horizon, hold only a limited number of
firms in their portfolios, and do not react much to current earning news
Bushee (1998)
Duration Weighted average of quarters a firm is part of investor’s holding for the past 5 years, i.e.,
average portfolio duration as described in Cremers and Pareek (2015)
13F, CRSP












∅Experience Average years of experience that the employed financial advisers have Egan et al.
(2018a)
Fired past Indicator for an institutional investor who employs one or more financial advisers that were





Exposure to idiosyncratic risk, relative to the Fama-French 3 factor portfolio (Winsorized at
1%), computed as described in Ang et al. (2006)
13F, CRSP
ln(Assets) Logarithm of the total assets under management of an investor 13F, CRSP
ln(#Stocks) Logarithm of the number of different stocks an investor holds 13F
(continued)
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Table 1: Variable definitions (ctd.)





indicator for below first quartile / above third quartile of investor quarterly TO 13F
MA Weighted average of the holdings’ managerial ability score, which captures the relative effi-
ciency with which a firm generates revenues, as described in Demerjian et al. (2012)
Demerjian
et al. (2012)
PWR Exploited portfolio WR, computed as the weighted average of the holdings’ WR for each
quarter
Author
PWRbuys Exploited portfolio WR of the stocks that an investor buys at the end of a quarter Author
PWRexit Exploited portfolio WR of the stocks that an investor exits at the end of a quarter Author
PWRinit Exploited portfolio WR of the stocks that represent the initiating trades of an investor at the
end of a quarter
Author
∆PWRnoTrade % difference between the investor’s current PWR and the PWR she would have had the
previous quarter if she did not rebalance her holdings
Author
PWRsell Exploited portfolio WR of the stocks that an investor sells at the end of a quarter Author
QIX Quasi-indexers, i.e., investors that exhibit high diversification and low turnover, consistent




Indicator for below first quartile / above third quartile of average holding period, computed
as described in Cremers and Pareek (2015)
13F
#qtrs Number of quarters a given investor is in the dataset 13F
Ret (qtr, %) Quarterly portfolio returns in %, assuming that all trades occur at the end of a given period
(Winsorized at 1%)
13F
Ret vola Volatility of quarterly returns for a given investor 13F, CRSP
(continued)
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Table 1: Variable definitions (ctd.)




TO Quarterly portfolio turnover of holdings, as described in Carhart (1997) 13F
TRA Transient investors, i.e., those that exhibit high diversification, high turnover, and react
strongly to current earning news
Bushee (1998)
WRcov % portfolio holdings for which WR can be computed in the respective quarter Author
α Abnormal return, computed as the intercept of a Fama-French 3 factor (FF-3) regression,




βCMA Exposure to the FF-5 conservative-minus-aggressive portfolio, computed using a rolling 12
quarters window (Winsorized at 1%)
Fama and
French (2015)








βRMW Exposure to the FF-3 robust-minus-weak portfolio, computed using a rolling 12 quarters
window (Winsorized at 1%)
Fama and
French (2015)




σPWR Time series volatility of quarterly PWR, for the period a given investor is in the dataset Author
(continued)
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Table 1: Variable definitions (ctd.)
Panel B: Firm level variables
CashETR Long-term effective cash tax rate, that captures the average cah taxes paid per dollar of
pre-tax earnings over five years, as described in Dyreng et al. (2008)
Compustat
DQ Disaggregation quality of financial statements, which captures the level of detail with which
anual reports are presemted, as described in Chen et al. (2015)
Compustat
DTAX Discretionary permanent tax differences, which capture the residual after estimating the per-
manent book-tax differences, as described in Frank et al. (2009)
Compustat
EM Earnings management proxy, computed as the average industry-year ranking of discretionary
accruals using the following models for estimated total accruals: Dechow et al. (1995), Jones
(1991), and Kothari et al. (2005)
Compustat
highVIX Indicator for quarters when the mean VIX index lies above the 90th percentile FRED
just beat Indicator for beating quarterly median analyst forecasts by no more than 1 USD cent, com-
puted according to Bhojraj et al. (2009)
I/B/E/S




#tax havens Indicator for above industry-average number of subsidiaries in tax haven countries, scaled by
the logarithm of firms’ assets
Dyreng and
Lindsey (2009)
∅VIX Quarterly average of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) FRED
(continued)
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Table 1: Variable definitions (ctd.)
WR Exploited regulatory “wiggle room” (WR), computed as the average industry-year percentile
rankings of: earnings management (EM), minus disaggregation quality of financial statements
(DQ), long-term effective cash tax rate (CashETR), and discretionary permanent tax differ-
ences (DTAX), together with an indicator for above industry-average number of subsidiaries
in tax haven countries (scaled by firm size), and an indicator for beating median analyst
forecasts by no more than 1 USD cent (beat)
Author
#WRcomp Number of proxies that are available for the computation of WR for a given fiscal year Author
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Table 2: Firm-level summary statistics
The table provides descriptive statistics for firm-level WR and for the proxies used for its
computation, displayed in absolute terms (instead of percentile rankings). The sample
spans from 1995 to 2017 and covers all firms in the Compustat - I/B/E/S universe. All
variables are described in Table 1.
Obs mean p25 p50 p75 sd min max
CashETR 59183 0.26 0.15 0.26 0.35 0.16 0.00 1.00
DQ 129194 0.70 0.62 0.71 0.78 0.11 0.10 0.97
DTAX 43029 0.14 -0.05 0.01 0.15 3.57 -187.06 251.89
EM 116804 0.47 0.30 0.44 0.63 0.22 0.01 1.00
just beat 93346 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00
#tax havens 90478 1.57 0.00 0.00 1.07 5.23 -188.47 200.18
WR 130074 0.38 0.27 0.37 0.48 0.16 0.00 1.00
#WRcomp 130555 4.06 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.16 0.00 6.00
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Table 3: Investor-level summary statistics
The table provides descriptive statistics for all variables of interest on the institutional
investor portfolio level. Performance variables have been winsorized at the 1% level.
The sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio holdings of
institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available. All variables
are described in Table 1.
Obs mean p25 p50 p75 sd min max
Duration 206242 5.95 3.20 5.47 8.22 3.37 0.07 20.00
Idiosyncratic risk 200239 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.14
ln(Assets) 206676 6.27 5.07 5.96 7.27 1.77 -5.18 15.55
ln(#Stocks) 206678 4.60 3.81 4.55 5.38 1.37 0.69 8.80
MA 201742 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.09 -0.30 0.63
PWR 206678 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.46 0.05 0.00 0.92
#qtrs in sample 206678 54.59 32.00 55.00 80.00 26.25 8.00 91.00
Ret (qtr, %) 206678 2.05 -2.15 2.87 7.07 9.56 -27.92 28.33
Return volatility 206678 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.93
Spec 206678 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00
TO 205204 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.00 1.18
WRcov (%) 206678 0.90 0.91 0.98 1.00 0.19 0.00 1.00
α 162220 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.08
βHML 162220 0.04 -0.15 0.03 0.24 0.46 -1.59 1.61
βMKT 162220 0.99 0.85 0.97 1.11 0.32 0.00 2.26
βSMB 162220 0.17 -0.13 0.06 0.37 0.54 -1.14 2.49
σPWR 206678 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.58
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Table 4: Investor horizon and turnover
The table provides results of regressions of PWR on investor horizon and turnover (TO).
Short- and long-term are defined as the first and fourth quartile of the portfolio duration
distribution. Low and high TO are defined as the first and last quartile of TO distribution.
The base category consists of the respectively remaining investors. All regressions control
for investor characteristics, time (quarter) fixed effects, and exposure to FF-3 factor
portfolios. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along quarter and investor, and t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample
spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio holdings of institutional
investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available. All variables are described
in Table 1.
Investment horizon Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
short-term -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(-5.71) (-5.65) (-3.11)
long-term 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(4.72) (4.50) (2.98)
low TO 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003∗
(4.04) (3.90) (2.51)
high TO -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(-7.11) (-7.09) (-4.87)
σPWR 0.066 0.081 0.056 0.073




∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.001
(-5.08) (-4.92) (-1.00) (-5.00) (-4.83) (-1.02)
βMKT -0.007
∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.003 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.003
(-3.32) (-3.21) (-1.65) (-3.44) (-3.25) (-1.72)
βSMB -0.019
∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(-11.97) (-12.99) (-10.88) (-12.08) (-12.49) (-10.63)
Constant 0.436∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(97.45) (34.47) (40.81) (92.21) (31.67) (38.88)
Observations 168901 167319 163124 162390 161295 157267
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Investor legal type and strategy
The table provides results of regressions of PWR on investor legal type and strategy, as
provided in Bushee (1998). The base categories are miscellaneous investors respectively
quasi-indexers. All regressions control for investor characteristics, time (quarter) fixed
effects, and exposure to FF-3 factor portfolios. Standard errors are multi-way clustered
along quarter and investor, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. The sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly
portfolio holdings of institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are
available. All variables are described in Table 1.
Lagal type Strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004
(3.44) (3.41) (1.56)
Corp. pension 0.000 0.004 0.000
(0.01) (0.76) (0.10)
Invst. advisor -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.66) (-0.75) (-0.54)
Insurance 0.004 0.003 0.001
(0.90) (0.78) (0.38)
Public pension 0.006 0.005 0.003
(1.90) (1.79) (1.18)
Endowments 0.005 0.001 -0.003
(0.56) (0.08) (-0.47)
DED -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(-7.14) (-7.20) (-5.67)
TRA -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(-5.19) (-5.12) (-3.14)
σPWR 0.080 0.088 0.055 0.073




∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.001
(-5.17) (-5.06) (-1.08) (-5.02) (-4.94) (-1.00)
βMKT -0.008
∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.004∗
(-4.14) (-3.89) (-2.21) (-4.00) (-3.64) (-2.00)
βSMB -0.020
∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(-12.22) (-12.81) (-10.41) (-11.42) (-12.00) (-10.04)
Constant 0.440∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(93.58) (34.86) (40.84) (87.93) (32.23) (36.55)
Observations 167377 166145 162390 164728 163756 160258
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Changes in PWR following financial adviser misconduct
The table depicts the average treatment effect that employing an adviser who discloses misconduct has on PWR. The
outcome variable in models (1) to (3) is the total change in quarterly PWR for the year of treatment. Outcome variables
in models (4) to (6) are the total changes in quarterly PWR occurring respectively the year before, the year after, and
two years after treatment. Treatment “Any” considers any type of misconduct disclsoed during a given year; “Criminal”
considers only disclosures that contain criminal charges; “Fired” considers only disclosures that lead to the firing of the
adviser. Data on financial adviser misconduct is described in Egan et al. (2018a,b). The control group is estimated via
nearest neighbor propensity score matching using year dummies and the following investor characteristics, measured on
the last available quarter before treatment: #Adivers, βHML, βMKT , βSMB, Duration, ∅Exam 63, ∅Exam 65, ∅Exam 66,
∅Experience, Fired past, ln(Assets), ln(# Stocks), Loss, and TO. Robust standard errors are computed according to Abadie
and Imbens (2006, 2016), and z-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample spans from 2007 to 2015 and covers
all institutional investors for which a match with FINRA’s BrokerCheck can be established. All variables are described in
Table 1.
Dependent variable (%): ∆PWRT ∆PWRT−1 ∆PWRT+1 ∆PWRT+2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Fired -4.637∗∗∗ -0.261 -2.742∗∗∗ -1.947
(-4.64) (-0.36) (-4.58) (-1.26)
Observations 6035 5067 6057 6047 4844 3728
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Drivers of changes in PWR following financial adviser misconduct
The table depicts the average treatment effect that employing an adviser who discloses misconduct has on the PWR of the
investor’s trades. The outcome variable in column (1) is the total change in PWR for the year of treatment. For columns
(2) to (5) the PWR of the portfolio of traded stocks during each quarter is computed by considering respectively only
buys, initiating buys, sells, and exited stocks. The outcome variables are the total yearly differences between the PWR of
the stocks traded and the PWR of the stocks held during a quarter. Column (6) reports the total % change in WR for
the firms the investor holds at the end of the quarter. Treatment is defined as disclosures that lead to the firing of the
adviser. Data on financial adviser misconduct is described in Egan et al. (2018a,b). The control group is estimated via
nearest neighbor propensity score matching using year dummies and the following investor characteristics, measured on
the last available quarter before treatment: #Adivers, βHML, βMKT , βSMB, Duration, ∅Exam 63, ∅Exam 65, ∅Exam 66,
∅Experience, Fired past, ln(Assets), ln(# Stocks), Loss, and TO. Robust standard errors are computed according to Abadie
and Imbens (2006, 2016), and z-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample spans from 2007 to 2015 and covers
all institutional investors for which a match with FINRA’s BrokerCheck can be established. All variables are described in
Table 1.
Drivers of ∆PWRT (%): Initial effect Buys Sells ∆WR












Type of financial misconduct:
Fired -4.637∗∗∗ -2.758∗∗∗ 0.578 -6.394 0.479∗∗∗ -4.262∗∗
(-4.64) (-4.91) (0.82) (-1.49) (3.56) (-3.11)
Observations 6057 6055 6055 6055 6055 6055
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: Excess returns and portfolio alphas
The table provides results of regressions of abnormal performance measures on PWR.
The first three models are regressions of quarterly excess returns on PWR, controlling
for exposure to the FF-3 portfolios. The last three are regressions of portfolio alphas
on PWR. All regressions control for investor characteristics, and time (quarter) fixed
effects. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along quarter and investor, and t-statistics
are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample
spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio holdings of institutional
investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available. All variables are described
in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Excess returns α
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PWR -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(-0.40) (-0.38) (-0.39) (-3.83) (-3.57) (-3.66)
βHML -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.37) (-0.32) (-0.33)
βMKT -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.23) (-0.28) (-0.28)
βSMB 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.56) (0.44) (0.55)
Constant 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.009 0.008 0.009
(0.48) (0.45) (0.44) (1.72) (1.39) (1.64)
Observations 158047 156981 157015 163446 156981 162390
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Horizon and TO No Yes No No Yes No
Strategy No No Yes No No Yes
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Table 9: Exposure to idiosyncratic risk
The table provides results of regressions of exposure to idiosyncratic risk on PWR after
controlling for exposure to the FF-3 portfolios. All regressions control for investor charac-
teristics, and time (quarter) fixed effects. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along
quarter and investor, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. The sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly
portfolio holdings of institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are
available. All variables are described in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Idiosyncratic risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PWR -0.071∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(-8.75) (-9.29) (-6.90) (-6.41) (-6.20)
σPWR -0.022 -0.027
∗ -0.024 -0.022
(-1.87) (-2.23) (-1.92) (-1.94)
MA -0.049∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(-15.32) (-13.66) (-12.47)
Constant 0.092∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(15.35) (14.43) (13.87) (11.59) (13.67)
Observations 214324 211703 207022 194200 183913
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Horizon and TO No No No Yes No
Strategy No No No No Yes
55
Table 10: Portfolio performance and risk measures - Individual WR proxies
The table provides results of regressions of abnormal performance measures and exposures
to idiosyncratic risk on the individual proxies for regulatory wiggle room exploitation.
These are first computed on the firm level, where I assign percentile rankings within
a given industry-year. Second, they are brought to a quarterly portfolio level through
the weighted average across an investor’s holdings. The dependent variables for models
(1) and (2) are quarterly excess returns, for (3) and (4) portfolio alphas, and for (5)
and (6) exposure to idiosyncratic risk. All regressions control for investor characteristics,
and time (quarter) fixed effects. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along quarter
and investor, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that
the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. The sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio
holdings of institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available.
All variables are described in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Excess returns α Idiosyncratic risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CashETR -0.009 -0.009 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(-0.21) (-0.21) (2.34) (2.17) (4.64) (5.67)
DQ -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(-0.11) (-0.12) (-1.26) (-1.02) (-3.46) (-3.71)
DTAX -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(-0.07) (-0.06) (1.50) (1.24) (1.31) (1.68)
EM -0.011 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 0.049∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(-0.16) (-0.14) (-1.31) (-1.13) (11.69) (12.18)
just beat -0.016 -0.016 -0.004 -0.004 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.95) (-1.05) (-5.47) (-5.75)
#tax havens -0.004 -0.005 -0.003∗ -0.004∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(-0.36) (-0.41) (-2.28) (-2.46) (-5.68) (-5.85)
Constant 0.034 0.035 0.002 0.004 0.046∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.44) (0.56) (0.90) (7.51) (9.52)
Observations 134980 135369 134980 140575 168731 175786
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Horizon and TO Yes No Yes No Yes No
Strategy No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 11: Market sentiment and uncertainty
The table provides results of regressions of quarterly PWR on the average orthogonal-
ized market sentiment and VIX during the current quarter. Sentiment is interacted with
dummy variables that identify investors by investment horizon through average portfolio
duration, trading intensity through quarterly prtfolio turnover (TO), and general invest-
ment strategy from Bushee (1998). All regressions control for the volatility of PWR,
portfolio MA, exposure to FF-3 factor portfolios, investor characteristics, and seasonality
via quarter-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along quarter
and investor, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that
the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. The sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio
holdings of institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available.
All variables are described in Table 1.
Sentiment⊥ VIX










short-term × Sent⊥t -0.005
∗∗∗
(-3.88)
long-term × Sent⊥t 0.000
(0.35)
low TO × Sent⊥t 0.002
(1.67)
high TO × Sent⊥t -0.003
∗∗
(-2.83)
DED × Sent⊥t 0.001
(0.23)
TRA × Sent⊥t 0.001
(0.37)
Constant 0.373∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(55.75) (55.77) (54.24) (32.09) (31.38) (30.00)
Observations 133452 133452 138162 163446 156981 160258
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Qtr-of-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Horizon and TO Yes Yes No No Yes No
Strategy No No Yes No No Yes
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Appendix
Figure A1: Number of disclosed misconduct cases by year
The figure depicts the distribution of the various misconduct types over time. #Advis
employed depicts the total number of financial advisers that were employed by the insti-
tutional investors in the sample during a given year; Any depicts the % of advisers that
disclosed misconduct cases during a given year; Criminal depicts the % of advisers that
disclosed criminal misconduct cases; Fired depicts the % of advisers that disclosed mis-
conduct cases that lead to the firing of the adviser. Data on financial adviser misconduct
is described in Egan et al. (2018a,b). The sample spans from 2007 to 2015 and covers all
institutional investors for which a match with FINRA’s BrokerCheck can be established.






































2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Year
#Advis employed (total) Any
Criminal Fired
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Table A1: Correlation of individual WR components
The table provides correlations between the industry-year rankings of yearly exploitation
measures computed on a firm level. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample
spans from 1995 to 2017 and covers all firms in the Compustat - I/B/E/S universe. All
variables are described in Table 1.
WR CashETR DQ DTAX EM just beat #tax havens
WR 1.00
CashETR 0.47∗∗∗ 1.00
DQ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 1.00
DTAX 0.45∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 1.00
EM 0.38∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 1.00
just beat 0.43∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ 1.00
#tax havens 0.63∗∗∗ 0.00 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 1.00
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Table A2: Investor-level summary statistics - Matched and full samples
The table compares descriptive statistics for all variables of interest between the matched
Thomson 13F - FINRA BrokerCheck sample and the full 13F sample. Performance
variables have been winsorized at the 1% level. The sample spans from 2007Q1 to 2015Q4,
and covers all quarterly portfolio holdings of institutional investors for which a minimum
of 8 observations are available. All variables are described in Table 1.
Matched sample Full sample
Obs mean p50 sd Obs mean p50 sd
Duration 40719 6.68 6.43 3.20 96374 6.00 5.48 3.42
Idiosyncratic risk 40514 0.02 0.02 0.02 94817 0.03 0.02 0.02
ln(Assets) 40763 6.15 5.80 1.62 96584 6.23 5.91 1.79
ln(#Stocks) 40763 4.70 4.63 1.06 96585 4.51 4.47 1.40
MA 40663 0.10 0.11 0.08 95802 0.09 0.10 0.09
PWR 40763 0.43 0.43 0.04 96585 0.42 0.42 0.05
#qtrs in sample 40763 29.89 34.00 7.98 96585 28.69 34.00 8.53
Ret (qtr, %) 40763 1.46 2.41 9.36 96585 1.50 2.46 10.22
Return volatility 40763 0.09 0.09 0.03 96585 0.10 0.10 0.04
Spec 40763 0.01 0.00 0.10 96585 0.03 0.00 0.16
TO 40712 0.10 0.06 0.10 95841 0.13 0.08 0.14
WRcov (%) 40763 0.86 0.97 0.24 96585 0.89 0.98 0.21
α 33863 0.00 0.00 0.01 77152 0.00 0.00 0.02
βHML 33863 0.01 0.01 0.36 77152 0.01 0.01 0.44
βMKT 33863 0.97 0.97 0.25 77152 1.01 0.98 0.31
βSMB 33863 0.13 0.05 0.48 77152 0.20 0.08 0.59
σPWR 40763 0.15 0.15 0.02 96585 0.15 0.15 0.02
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Table A3: Predicting assignment to treatment
The table provides results of logit regressions of a treatment indicator on investor char-
acteristics. Treatment “Any” considers any type of misconduct disclsoed during a given
year; “Criminal” considers only disclosures that contain criminal charges; “Fired” con-
siders only disclosures that lead to the firing of the adviser. Data on financial adviser
misconduct is described in Egan et al. (2018a,b). Standard errors are multi-way clustered
along quarter and investor, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. The sample spans from 2007 to 2015 and covers all institu-
tional investors for which a match with FINRA’s BrokerCheck can be established. All




#Advisers 0.014∗∗∗ (5.24) 0.003∗∗∗ (4.33) 0.005∗∗∗ (9.94)
βHML 0.231 (0.52) 0.722 (0.33) -0.271 (-0.65)
βMKT -0.896
∗ (-2.07) -2.263 (-1.30) -0.084 (-0.11)
βSMB -0.049 (-0.15) -0.002 (-0.00) -0.901
∗ (-2.39)
Duration -0.081 (-1.05) 0.005 (0.04) -0.025 (-0.40)
∅Exam 63 1.065∗∗∗ (3.47) 0.945∗ (2.03) 0.788 (1.59)
∅Exam 65 0.855 (1.82) 0.720 (1.16) 0.939∗ (2.03)
∅Exam 66 2.243∗∗∗ (4.81) 3.056∗∗∗ (4.99) 2.625∗∗∗ (4.31)
∅Experience -0.015 (-0.53) -0.050 (-0.56) -0.038 (-0.99)
Fired past 9.426∗∗∗ (6.01) 11.786∗∗∗ (5.41) 9.574∗∗∗ (6.31)
ln(Assets) -0.445∗∗∗ (-8.08) -0.337 (-1.29) -0.292∗ (-2.15)
Loss 0.574 (1.37) -0.823 (-0.83) 0.205 (0.17)
TO -1.503 (-1.24) -1.418 (-0.24) -0.003 (-0.00)
ln(#Stocks) 0.465∗∗ (2.61) 1.155∗ (2.56) 0.788∗∗ (2.76)
Constant -4.167∗∗∗ (-4.09) -9.314∗∗∗ (-3.49) -8.209∗∗∗ (-4.65)
Observations 6035 5067 6057
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
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Table A4: Balancing of treatment and control group
The table provides mean comparison for the treated and control groups obtained by the
propensity score matching. Treatment “Any” considers any type of misconduct disclsoed
during a given year; “Fired” considers only disclosures that lead to the termination of the
employment contract between the adviser and her employer. Data on financial adviser
misconduct is described in Egan et al. (2018a,b). The control group is estimated via near-
est neighbor propensity score matching using year dummies and the following investor
characteristics, measured on the last available quarter before treatment: #Adivers, βHML,
βMKT , βSMB, Duration, ∅Exam 63, ∅Exam 65, ∅Exam 66, ∅Experience, Fired past,
ln(Assets), ln(# Stocks), Loss, and TO. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along
year and investor. The sample spans from 2007 to 2015 and covers all institutional in-
vestors for which a match with FINRA’s BrokerCheck can be established. All variables
are described in Table 1.
Type of treatment:
Any Fired
Treatment Control (t stat) Treatment Control (t stat)
#Advisers 258.23 255.07 (0.10) 530.01 521.57 (0.09)
βHML 0.03 0.06 (-1.20) 0.03 0.06 (-0.82)
βMKT 0.92 0.94 (-0.85) 0.90 0.91 (-0.20)
βSMB 0.04 0.02 (0.64) 0.02 -0.01 (0.65)
Duration 6.74 7.02 (-1.10) 6.76 6.81 (-0.14)
∅Exam 63 0.62 0.54 (3.22) 0.66 0.66 (-0.19)
∅Exam 65 0.51 0.57 (-2.26) 0.50 0.46 (1.10)
∅Exam 66 0.36 0.33 (0.87) 0.38 0.43 (-1.13)
∅Experience 6.91 6.34 (1.77) 6.94 6.41 (1.27)
Fired past 0.01 0.01 (-0.39) 0.02 0.01 (1.41)
ln(Assets) 7.08 7.85 (-2.82) 7.25 7.41 (-0.58)
Loss 0.26 0.23 (0.65) 0.19 0.28 (-1.35)
TO 0.09 0.08 (1.08) 0.09 0.09 (-0.14)
ln(#Stocks) 5.87 5.78 (0.64) 6.16 6.17 (-0.03)
Observations 160 5875 75 5982
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A5: Excess returns and portfolio alphas
The table provides results of regressions of excess performance measures on PWR. The
first three models are regressions of quarterly excess returns on PWR, controlling for
exposure to the FF-5 portfolios. The last three are regressions of portfolio alphas on
PWR. All regressions control for investor characteristics, and time (quarter) fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along quarter and investor, and t-statistics
are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample
spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio holdings of institutional
investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available. All variables are described
in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Excess returns α
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PWR -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-3.41) (-3.10) (-3.14)
σPWR -0.013 -0.019 -0.015 -0.022 -0.017 -0.019
(-0.10) (-0.13) (-0.11) (-1.58) (-1.15) (-1.35)
MA 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (-1.51) (-0.97) (-1.29)
βCMA 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
βHML -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.27) (-0.25) (-0.23)
βMKT -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.11) (-0.17) (-0.16)
βRMW -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.69) (-0.64) (-0.70)
βSMB 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.92) (0.84) (0.96)
Constant 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.021∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.018∗
(0.43) (0.39) (0.39) (2.61) (2.08) (2.31)
Observations 158047 156981 157015 163446 156981 162390
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Horizon and TO No Yes No No Yes No
Strategy No No Yes No No Yes
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Table A6: Exposure to idiosyncratic risk
The table provides results of regressions of exposure to idiosyncratic risk on PWR after
controlling for exposure to the FF-5 portfolios. All regressions control for investor char-
acteristics, and time (quarter) fixed effects. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along
quarter and investor, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. The sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly
portfolio holdings of institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are
available. All variables are described in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Idiosyncratic risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PWR -0.057∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(-9.04) (-9.53) (-6.91) (-6.48) (-6.36)
σPWR -0.015 -0.020
∗ -0.017 -0.015
(-1.62) (-2.12) (-1.76) (-1.67)
MA -0.041∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(-16.37) (-14.58) (-13.35)
Constant 0.074∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(17.51) (16.38) (15.76) (13.26) (14.72)
Observations 214324 211703 207022 194200 183913
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Horizon and TO No No No Yes No
Strategy No No No No Yes
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Table A7: Portfolio performance and risk measures - Individual WR proxies
The table provides results of regressions of exposure to idiosyncratic risk after controlling
for the FF-5 factors on the individual proxies for regulatory wiggle room exploitation.
These are first computed on the firm level, where I assign percentile rankings within
a given industry-year. Second, they are brought to a quarterly portfolio level through
the weighted average across an investor’s holdings. The dependent variables for models
(1) and (2) are quarterly excess returns, for (3) and (4) portfolio alphas, and for (5)
and (6) exposure to idiosyncratic risk. All regressions control for investor characteristics,
and time (quarter) fixed effects. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along quarter
and investor, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that
the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. The sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio
holdings of institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available.
All variables are described in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Excess returns α Idiosyncratic risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CashETR -0.008 -0.008 0.009∗ 0.008∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(-0.18) (-0.18) (2.44) (2.26) (4.37) (5.41)
DQ -0.004 -0.005 -0.010∗ -0.010∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.008∗∗
(-0.08) (-0.10) (-2.35) (-2.41) (-2.75) (-2.88)
DTAX -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(-0.06) (-0.06) (0.76) (0.75) (1.08) (1.43)
EM -0.014 -0.012 0.012∗ 0.013∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(-0.22) (-0.20) (2.10) (2.47) (11.50) (11.69)
just beat -0.015 -0.015 -0.003 -0.004 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.75) (-1.02) (-5.43) (-5.69)
#tax havens -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(-0.25) (-0.30) (-1.61) (-1.70) (-5.82) (-5.91)
Constant 0.030 0.031 0.008 0.009 0.037∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.39) (1.73) (1.81) (8.10) (9.76)
Observations 134980 135369 134980 140575 168731 175786
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Horizon and TO Yes No Yes No Yes No
Strategy No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table A8: Lagged market sentiment and uncertainty
The table provides results of regressions of quarterly PWR on the average orthogonlaized
market sentiment and VIX during the previous quarter. Sentiment is interacted with
dummy variables that identify investors by investment horizon through average portfolio
duration, trading intensity through quarterly prtfolio turnover (TO), and general invest-
ment strategy from Bushee (1998). All regressions control for the volatility of PWR,
portfolio MA, exposure to FF-3 factor portfolios, investor characteristics, and seasonality
via quarter-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are multi-way clustered along quarter
and investor, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that
the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. The sample spans from 1995Q1 to 2017Q4, and covers all quarterly portfolio
holdings of institutional investors for which a minimum of 8 observations are available.
All variables are described in Table 1.
Sentiment⊥ (lagged) VIX (lagged)










short-term × Sent⊥t−1 -0.005
∗∗∗
(-3.97)
long-term × Sent⊥t−1 0.001
(0.78)
low TO × Sent⊥t−1 0.003
∗
(2.34)
high TO × Sent⊥t−1 -0.003
∗∗
(-2.99)
DED × Sent⊥t−1 0.001
(0.13)
TRA × Sent⊥t−1 0.001
(0.76)
Constant 0.374∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(57.52) (57.59) (56.29) (31.65) (30.97) (29.87)
Observations 132692 132692 137367 162649 156221 159463
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Qtr-of-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Horizon and TO Yes Yes No No Yes No
Strategy No No Yes No No Yes
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